Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development.

Simulasi Imbalan Masuk Pasar untuk Pengembangan Antibiotik.

Clicks: 505
ID: 92960
2018
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Abstract
We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.
Kami merancang model Monte Carlo berbasis agen untuk penelitian dan pengembangan (R&D) antibiotik guna mengeksplorasi dampak intervensi kebijakan yang dikenal sebagai *Market Entry Reward* (MER) terhadap kemungkinan antibiotik yang memasuki tahap pengembangan praklinis dapat mencapai pasar. Melalui analisis sensitivitas, kami mengkaji interaksi antara MER dan empat parameter utama: proyeksi pendapatan bersih, biaya R&D, tingkat diskonto pemodal ventura, dan ambang batas finansial organisasi farmasi besar. Kami menunjukkan bahwa peningkatan pendapatan mungkin lebih efisien daripada pengurangan biaya, dan dengan demikian mengonfirmasi bahwa intervensi kebijakan berbasis tarikan (*pull-based*) ini secara efektif menstimulasi R&D antibiotik.
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Authors Okhravi, Christopher;Callegari, Simone;McKeever, Steve;Kronlid, Carl;Baraldi, Enrico;Lindahl, Olof;Ciabuschi, Francesco;
Journal the journal of law, medicine & ethics : a journal of the american society of law, medicine & ethics
Year 2018
DOI
10.1177/1073110518782913
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