From Design to Disclosure

Clicks: 3
ID: 340648
2026
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Ranked #215 of 217 articles by views in The Review of Economic Studies

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Abstract
Abstract We study the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing, insurance contracting, and policy negotiations. Across these settings, the sender is worst off if she reveals her type completely because the receiver would then adjust the terms of trade to extract her surplus. Taking this feature as our central departure from the literature, we characterize the entire set of equilibrium payoffs in these disclosure games. We prove an equivalence result: a payoff profile can be approximated by an equilibrium of the disclosure game if and only if it can be achieved through information design. Thus, there exist equilibria in which the sender obtains approximately her commitment payoff.
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Authors
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdag125
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