Individual Responsibility for Global Problems

Clicks: 1
ID: 338455
2026
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal

Ranked #1,764 of 1,787 articles by views in Oxford University Press eBooks

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 1,787 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
Abstract Environmental challenges like climate change raise a daunting moral problem: these problems are so large and complex that individuals cannot meaningfully cause or worsen them. And yet, it seems like individuals still have some moral responsibility to act in response. Although this challenge of “causal inefficacy” is well-recognized, this chapter demonstrates that massive threats like climate change raise additional problems as well for those who want to understand the moral responsibility of individuals. One is that such problems seem to be the responsibility of the structures and collectives that are able to solve them, rather than individuals; another is that, if individuals actually have a duty to respond to all catastrophic threats, then each person would be paralyzed by an overwhelming number of duties. In response, this chapter argues that all of these challenges can be addressed by modifying one’s expectations for an account of “responsibility.”
Reference Key
openalex_W7225143806 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Travis N. Rieder
Are you one of these authors? Claim your profile
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/9780197807262.003.0006
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197807262.003.0006
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.