Afterword

Associate Professor, Department of Government Those who take it upon themselves to defend democracy are frequently confronted with a practical dilemma: to support repressive measures against those who challenge the fundamental tenets of democracy, or to engage with them as if they were ordinary adversaries. This book has proposed that the defence of democracy should move beyond the dichotomy of toleration or non-toleration and frame the problem in a more nuanced way. Indeed, the emphasis on militant and tolerant approaches has obscured a third possibility: that of examining the social injustices that fuel antidemocratic sentiment. Such a social logic of democratic self-defence is often predicated on the characteristics of autocratic tendencies. Contemporary authoritarian populism, for example, is the result of a combination of factors, with social malaise being the primary contributing element. The question of whether to engage or to repress it diverts attention from the social roots of authoritarian populism and similar movements that challenge democratic principles. A second lesson indicates a need to extend the scope of democratic self-defence. Law, and especially constitutional law, has long been regarded as a pivotal mechanism for regulating political rivalry in a manner that safeguards the democratic system. Despite the fact that the dilemmas of democratic self-defence manifest initially as constitutional concerns, it has now become imperative to transcend the limitations of constitutional models and to broaden the scope of democratic self-defence to encompass other institutional settings. Militant, tolerant, and social instruments are not merely aspects of a constitutional infrastructure; they are modes of action that manifest in numerous domains of democratic society. The ideas that emerge from constitutional dilemmas inspire many other fields of action, including ordinary legislation, public policies, political initiatives, formal and informal decisions, as well as citizen activism. The view that the defence of democracy begins with the constitution is often associated with a tendency to equate democracy with liberal constitutionalism. But democracy does not live, thrive, or erode in the courtroom. It is embedded in and dependent on democratic society. It is therefore time to look beyond the courts for guardians of democracy and to consider non-state actors, such as political parties or civil-society actors, as primary defenders of democracy. To be sure, political and civil-society actors do not have the same types or scale of resources and opportunities to deal with challengers to democracy, nor do they feel the same degree of pressure and responsibility to contain democratic threats. However, people in different positions want to defend democracy, and they are fairly capable of doing so. And democracy, especially when it is in crisis, needs everyone. So the question is not who ought to defend democracy, but how those who want to defend democracy can do so. A theoretical framework for democratic self-defence is useful if it can offer guidance to as many actors as possible. The framework proposed in this book attempts to do this by distinguishing between modes of action based on their diagnosis of the nature of the democratic threat, the means that correspond to this diagnosis, and their objective. Threats can be treated as extraordinary and urgent; as ordinary and conventional; or as an epiphenomenon of social pathologies. They can be addressed by exceptional measures, by measures consistent with a democratic framework, or by social interventions. The aim of these measures may be to exclude and isolate the target actor, to include and engage with them; or to include them in a social-egalitarian sense. Thus, an action can be classified as militant, tolerant, or social according to the logic adopted at the levels of diagnosis, means, and objectives, rather than by the sphere in which it occurs, or the identity of its actors. Characterising an action as militant, tolerant, or social immediately situates it within a set of normative justifications and criticisms associated with that ideal type. Each of the three broad ideal types of democratic self-defence is supported by distinct kinds of normative arguments. Militant action may be justified by appeals to the protection of constitutional identity, requirements of rationality, or the severity of the harm posed by a threat. Toleration, by contrast, is often grounded in commitments to fair procedures and freedom of speech—understood as promoting truth, legitimacy, or better decision-making—as well as in the moderating effects of participation and the value of counter-speech. Social responses, finally, are justified by democracy’s dependence on egalitarian social integration, meaningful social representation, material constitutionalism, social security, and the political struggle against capitalism. Together, these normative arguments reflect broader philosophical and ideological positions that serve as a mental compass when difficult ethical-political choices must be made. Actions in defence of democracy need to be based on principles that extend beyond mere strategic considerations because they can backfire or be fiercely contested. Accusations of either political opportunism when dangerous actors are over-excluded, or complicity with them when they are not, can severely undermine democratic self-defence. Anticipating accusations like these is particularly important in times of democratic polarisation and erosion. In such circumstances, robust norms and principles to guide action are paramount. Indeed, to better evaluate responses to democratic backsliding and authoritarian populism, it is important to focus not only on the efficiency of responses, but also on their legitimacy and credibility. One problem with questions of efficiency, for example, is that they often take for granted who are the pro-democrats and who are the antidemocrats. But the lines between these two categories are becoming increasingly blurred. In recent years, for example, authoritarian populists have become increasingly mainstream, while mainstream actors have themselves adopted elements of populist politics. This makes the question of who can legitimately target whom more difficult to answer. The boundary between democratic and antidemocratic politics is difficult to draw with precision, largely because defenders of democracy do not share a single understanding of what ‘democracy’ means. Their differing conceptions of democracy shape both how they identify legitimate targets of containment and how they believe challenges to democracy should be addressed. Conceptions of democracy vary not only across ideal types, but also within individual ideal types themselves. Militant democrats, in general, draw on a tradition that prioritises constitutional commitments over popular participation. These views become more specific when attention shifts to specific sub-variants of militant democracy. For instance, one influential militant democrat understands democracy as a self-correcting system. On this view, what must be protected above all is democracy’s capacity for self-correction. This definitional starting point also determines who or what counts as a fundamental threat—namely, actors or actions that undermine that capacity. Justifications for militant democracy, as well as views on how democracy should be defended and against whom, therefore vary considerably depending on the underlying conception of democracy endorsed. The same logic applies to all the normative traditions discussed in this book. For example, a tolerant democrat who regards freedom of speech as a foundation of political legitimacy would seek to defend democracy primarily by protecting free expression. At the same time, such a democrat would identify a fundamental threat to democracy in actions or actors that restrict freedom of speech. From this theoretical perspective, even free-speech absolutism that allows antidemocratic messages to proliferate and gain influence without restriction would ironically qualify as a form of ‘defence of democracy’. From the viewpoint of social defenders, on the other hand, democracy is closely tied to social inclusion. For example, one prominent proponent of this view argues that the most important democratic safeguard is universal social security. Actors or actions that threaten this fundamental pillar are seen as indirectly undermining democracy, even if the connection between antidemocratic and antisocial policies is neither direct nor immediately visible. Social defenders may recognise institutional abuses, such as court packing, as antidemocratic, but interpret them as symptoms of deeper social disintegration that pose a greater threat. In this context, court packing would be condemned, but the primary focus of defence would be to restore universal social security, thereby sustaining citizens’ commitment to the democratic project. Enemies of democracy have existed in the past, continue to operate in the present, and will inevitably emerge in the future. Theories of democratic self-defence offer both normative guidance and analytical tools: they justify various types of responses, indicate how these responses can be combined and adapted to specific contexts, and help anticipate potential threats before they fully materialise. Central to these theories is the principle that what is essential to the survival of democracy is also what must be defended; it serves as the key marker that should trigger action whenever it is under threat. For this reason, democratic self-defence requires a clear foundation in well-defined understandings of democracy. More than a means of shielding democracy from harm, democratic self-defence can also serve as a project of renewal. By engaging with its vulnerabilities and recognising its imperfections, these theories transform potential weaknesses into opportunities for improvement. In this way, the very features that make democracy fragile also provide opportunities for repairing, strengthening and guiding it towards a more resilient, inclusive, and adaptive form, one that can respond to both present challenges and future uncertainties while remaining true to its fundamental principles.