On the Exculpatory Moral Economy of AI-DSS

Clicks: 1
ID: 338410
2026
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal

Ranked #1,719 of 1,787 articles by views in Oxford University Press eBooks

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 1,787 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Abstract This article analyzes the foundational concepts underpinning the European Union’s governance of artificial intelligence decision support systems (AI-DSSs): “trustworthy AI” and “human oversight.” Evidence from behavioral psychology, computer science, and ethics and legal scholarship demonstrates that automation bias, selective adherence, and AI hypersuasion systematically undermine meaningful human agency (MHA). Furthermore, the anthropomorphic discourse of trustworthiness obscures moral responsibility rather than ensuring accountability. This situation raises a significant question left unresolved in the literature: why does the oversight paradigm persist and even expand despite its well-documented insufficiency? To address this, the article applies the moral economy framework, as developed by E. P. Thompson and further elaborated by Bonini and Treré, to the context of AI-DSS deployment. It delineates four key positions: deployers, subjects, resistors, and the conscripted human-in-the-loop. The analysis identifies the dominant value system in this field as an exculpatory moral economy, in which protective norms are fulfilled through performance rather than genuine protection, resulting in the receipt of trust and the granting of absolution. From this perspective, the failure of oversight is not a flaw to be corrected but an intended outcome of the arrangement. The article advocates for a strong presumption against deploying AI-DSSs in sensitive areas of societal governance. Where deployment continues, it proposes two legally grounded avenues for organized societal resistance to uncritical AI-DSS deployment: promoting moral economy-aware critical AI literacy, which furthers skepticism rather than trust, and establishing collective MHA councils, rooted in the AI Act and the precautionary principle.
Reference Key
openalex_W7225098080 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/9780198945215.003.0079
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.