Egalitarianism

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ID: 338321
2026
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Abstract
Philosophy Egalitarianism has to do with the equal distribution of some good, or equal moral and political standing, or both. In the minimal sense, egalitarianism affirms the equal worth, standing, value, or rights of persons. This immediately raises the question of rights or standing within a particular political community versus rights or standing in a global, cosmopolitan sense. More substantive forms of egalitarianism deal with distributive justice. A distributive egalitarian theory identifies some good that ideally would be distributed equally, unless there is some pressing reason to allow an unequal distribution. Two questions arise. First, what is the metric that ideally would be distributed equally? Resources, welfare (in the sense of well-being), opportunities, or capabilities to engage in certain sorts of valuable activities? Second, is equality about equal starting positions or equal outcomes? Both of these questions can intersect with the problem of whether inequalities stemming from unchosen brute luck are different from inequalities due to option luck—that is, stemming from choice-based differences in prudence, effort, or risk-taking. Theorists committed to distributive equality may view it as intrinsically good or merely instrumentally good. Those who see it as intrinsically good think there are compelling moral and/or political arguments that an equal distribution of some good is desirable for its own sake. Recent relational views of egalitarianism see distribution as merely instrumental to the point of equality, which is having persons stand to each other in social relationships that are respectful and equal. Such social relationships have distributive preconditions, but the view is not fundamentally about distributive equality. Social equality sees a focus on distribution itself, and the choice/luck distinction, as missing the point of equality. Inequality as a morally troubling phenomenon is socially imposed subordination. Distributive equality is at most instrumental in bringing about equal social standing. The following sections provide a curated selection of entries covering all of these topics.
Reference Key
openalex_W7225150630 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Ryan Long
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Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/9780197859131.003.0450
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197859131.003.0450
Keywords Keywords not found

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