Price Gouging and the Monopoly Option

Clicks: 12
ID: 334173
2026
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Emerging

Ranked #212 of 212 articles by views in The Review of Economic Studies

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 212 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Abstract We investigate a dynamic oligopoly model with two phases: a normal phase where an essential input is available, and a disruption phase where firms must rely on inventories. Disruptions create an overcutting pricing incentive arising from the option to forgo sales and monopolize the market once rivals stock out. This monopoly option causes the price to jump to a supracompetitive level at the advent of the disruption and to remain above the competitive price path throughout. Price caps raise welfare, but reduce inventory investment. Government reserves reduce prices and raise buffer stocks, as do reserve mandates when financially feasible.
Reference Key
openalex_W7223691185 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdag119
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.