Some Objections to Phenomenal Conservatism about Inferential Justification

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ID: 332500
2026
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Abstract
Abstract Proponents of phenomenal conservatism appeal to one’s experiences – in particular, to one’s seemings or appearances – to account for non-inferential justification. Some extend this approach to the inferential case. On Michael Huemer’s view, inferential seemings yield inferential justification: if it seems that the conclusion of an inference is true in light of the premisses being true, then – provided our belief in the premisses is justified – we gain some justification for believing the conclusion. I develop two Ramsey-inspired objections to this view. First, inferential seemings are too coarse-grained to account for differences in degree of justification. Second, inferences with the same degree of justification can be accompanied by very different intensities of seeming, and Huemer’s view implausibly rules out justified overconfidence. Both objections resist a potential type of response Huemer might offer to an objection from Smithies (2019).
Reference Key
openalex_W7222271035 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Weng Hong Tang
Journal journal of pharmaceutical analysis
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/analys/anag078
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anag078
Keywords Keywords not found

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