Irreducible Causal Powers and Compatibilism

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ID: 327325
2026
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Abstract
Abstract Many philosophers hold that free will consists in the exercise of an agent's irreducible causal powers. However, it is controversial whether a powers-based approach to free will is compatible with determinism or not. In two papers published in this journal, Mumford and Anjum (2014) and Conti (2025) offer opposite answers to this question: Mumford and Anjum argue that a powers-based theory of free will implies incompatibilism, whereas Conti argues that it implies compatibilism. In this article, I defend Mumford and Anjum's view against Conti's objections. My argument will be based on some crucial clarifications regarding the definition of determinism.
Reference Key
openalex_W7204648342 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Qichen Yan
Journal journal of pharmaceutical analysis
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/analys/anag071
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anag071
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