Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition

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ID: 324800
2026
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Abstract
Abstract We study monopolistic certification in markets where sellers possess partial private information about product quality. A certifier can provide information through two channels: screening sellers’ private information (soft information) and acquiring new quality data (hard information). We prove that any certification menu achieving less than maximal screening is Pareto dominated by one with full screening. Among Pareto-efficient menus, the certifier’s profit-maximising menu provides maximal soft information while restricting hard information provision. The two channels diverge because screening creates value the certifier can fully capture, whereas hard information amplifies costly information rents. Using power value functions, we derive comparative statics showing that information restrictions target low-quality sellers when information value is moderate, but high-quality sellers receive perfect quality revelation when information value is high.
Reference Key
openalex_W7113151568 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Gorkem Celik, Roland Strausz
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdag083
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag083
Keywords Keywords not found

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