Embracing the Enemy

Clicks: 4
ID: 324618
2026
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Abstract
Abstract A principal (such as a centrist political party) can partially influence the allocation of power between two competing parties. The principal is closer to one party, the ``Friend'', than to the other, the ``Enemy''. The principal's optimal contract initially seeks to exclude the Enemy. However, once the Enemy gains power, the principal embraces him in exchange for policy moderation. Moderation also disciplines the Friend, inducing him to move closer to the principal's preferred policy. Principals close to the Friend fully embrace the Enemy; more centrist principals divide their support. Commitment benefits the principal only if she is close to the Friend and parties value power little.
Reference Key
openalex_W7202167496 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Álvaro Delgado-Vega, Johannes Schneider
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdag090
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

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