Peano, Frege, and Russell’s Logical Influences

Clicks: 1
ID: 322057
2026
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
0.0 /100
Combines engagement data with AI-assessed academic quality
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Abstract This chapter addresses the historical influences on Russell’s views in logic and his particular style of symbolic logic. Some credit Gottlob Frege as the main source of Russell’s advocacy of symbolic logic in philosophy and endorsement of logicism, the theory that mathematics reduces to logic. In fact, Russell came to these positions independently, having first discovered modern symbolic logic in the writings of the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano and his school. Russell adopted his own notation by modifying theirs and, through it, first became convinced of logicism. He discovered the (mostly earlier) works of Gottlob Frege only later, but Frege’s ideas thereafter became more influential, especially as Russell toiled at solving logical paradoxes and puzzles about meaning hampering his earlier work. Russell’s mature views about philosophical and mathematical logic, propositional functions, classes, logical types, and the theory of meaning can be seen in many ways as a reaction to the flaws in Frege’s.
Reference Key
openalex_W7170044031 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Kevin C. Klement
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190845667.013.5
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.