The Politics of Public Pensions: Parties, State Governments, and Unions by Carolyn Abott
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ID: 321711
2026
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Abstract
In The Politics of Public Budgeting, Irene Rubin argues that fiscal discipline depends on sustained support from key political actors. If politicians, policymakers, and influential interest groups do not prioritize stability, fiscal discipline will not occur. Carolyn Abott advances a similar claim in The Politics of Public Pensions: responsible stewardship requires stable coalitions. This persuasive argument comes amid heightened concern that pension costs may crowd out other public spending. Abott's theory and findings align with research indicating pensions’ problems are not uniquely Democratic. However, she also adds nuance, challenging the view of labor dominance and calling for a form of conditional pension governance, in which labor's influence varies with partisan competition. In machine-like states, Democrats capture unions, which often support policies that contain pension costs, limit taxation, and aid in elections. Under alternating control, however, both parties compete for public employees, sometimes expanding benefits. Unions may work with Republicans, but the strategy can backfire if those officials undermine collective bargaining and organizing power.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W7169836154
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|---|---|
| Authors | John Brooks |
| Journal | political science quarterly |
| Year | 2026 |
| DOI |
10.1093/psquar/qqag056
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| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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