Understanding Legal Affairs Through the Prism of Game Theory

Clicks: 1
ID: 318831
2026
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal

Ranked #1,490 of 1,518 articles by views in Oxford University Press eBooks

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 1,518 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
Abstract Game theory is a field of microeconomics that describes and tries to predict people’s strategic behavior in interactive decision-making settings when one’s choices impact and are impacted by the others’ decisions. Among the game theory models, the prisoner’s dilemma is probably the most recognized. Research using game theory in Law & Management settings is at its infancy, even though game theory relates to corporate legal performance in different ways. First, statutes and regulation create risks and rewards that corporation need to navigate. Additionally, parties may, through contractual mechanisms, define the rules for their future relationship, especially by rewarding cooperation and punishing adverse behavior. Furthermore, game theory is relevant to dispute resolution when parties are offered different strategic and processual choices, with different levels of uncertainty. One rare study of game theory taken in a Law & Management approach deals with public–private partnerships in pharmaceutical research. Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of simplifying situations into game theory models, focusing on the complexity and subjectivity of what corporations consider to be gains and rewards, as well as the asymmetric distribution of information in real-life scenarios.
Reference Key
openalex_W7165886751 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Kevin Favre, Adrian Borbély
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197769034.013.0031
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197769034.013.0031
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.