Competitive Advertising and Pricing

Clicks: 6
ID: 318040
2026
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Ranked #29 of 196 articles by views in The Review of Economic Studies

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Abstract
Abstract We consider an oligopoly model in which each firm chooses not only its price but also its advertising strategy regarding how much, and what, product information to provide. To highlight firms' strategic incentives, we impose no structural restrictions on feasible advertising content, so that each firm can disclose or conceal any information. We obtain a comprehensive characterization of the equilibrium advertising strategy and provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric pure-price equilibria. We show that intense competition induces firms to provide accurate product information; firms usually obfuscate consumers' relatively low or high values; and requiring firms to provide more product information can reduce social surplus and also be harmful to consumers.
Reference Key
openalex_W7165153529 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Ilwoo Hwang, Kyungmin Kim, Raphael Boleslavsky
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdag062
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