Weak Legal Guardrails

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ID: 317940
2026
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Abstract
Abstract A potential great power conflict in the Indo-Pacific—including a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons—would implicate legal regimes relating to the use of force, the law of war, and the allocation of war powers under the U.S. Constitution. In practice, however, this chapter observes that none of these bodies of law is likely to be a significant constraint on the recourse to or use of nuclear weapons by the United States. The U.S. executive branch has developed permissive legal doctrines and interpretations that afford it broad latitude in the use of force. The weakness of these legal checks reinforces the necessity of reducing the risk of any such conflict.
Reference Key
openalex_W7165179172 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Brian Finucane
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/oso/9780197844540.003.0018
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197844540.003.0018
Keywords Keywords not found

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