Market Segmentation through Information

Clicks: 5
ID: 317727
2026
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Steady

Ranked #25 of 195 articles by views in The Review of Economic Studies

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 195 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
Abstract We explore the power that precise information about consumers’ preferences grants an intermediary in shaping competition. We think of an intermediary as an information designer who chooses what information to reveal to firms, which then compete à la Bertrand in a differentiated product market. We analyze the information designs that maximize consumer and producer surplus and uncover systematic differences in how information can be used to intensify or soften competition. Our analysis demonstrates the power that users’ data can endow intermediaries with and speaks directly to current regulatory debates regarding digital marketplaces.
Reference Key
openalex_W3164373510 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Matthew Elliott, Andrea Galeotti, Ae-Ran Koh, Wenhao Li
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdag067
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag067
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.