Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Mind

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ID: 314463
2026
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Abstract
Abstract This chapter traces the development of Bertrand Russell’s philosophy of mind from his early engagements with panpsychism and idealism through his dualist period and finally to his mature neutral monism. It advances three central claims. First, Russell’s positions on the mind are consistently shaped by his sustained engagement with empirical psychology and the natural sciences. Second, his shifting accounts of mentality are closely tied to evolving views about experience, the subject of experience, and the scope and limits of introspection. Third, the trajectory of Russell’s philosophy of mind is more complex and less linear than is often acknowledged, involving significant continuities as well as substantive revisions.
Reference Key
openalex_W7162017266 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Donovan Wishon
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190845667.013.12
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190845667.013.12
Keywords Keywords not found

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