Market Power and Transferable Property Rights

Clicks: 17
ID: 307203
1984
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Abstract
The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem—the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region.
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openalex_W2011854210 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1984
DOI
10.2307/1883124
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Keywords Keywords not found

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