Market Power and Transferable Property Rights

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ID: 307203
1984
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Abstract
The appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal. When competition is not a foregone conclusion, the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage. This paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights. First, a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence. This is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem—the control of particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region.
Reference Key
openalex_W2011854210 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Robert W. Hahn
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1984
DOI
10.2307/1883124
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/1883124
Keywords Keywords not found

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