Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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ID: 306845
1974
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Abstract
Journal Article Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Get access Mark V. Pauly Mark V. Pauly Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 88, Issue 1, February 1974, Pages 44–62, https://doi.org/10.2307/1881793 Published: 01 February 1974
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| Reference Key |
openalex_W2027088814
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|---|---|
| Authors | Mark V. Pauly |
| Journal | the quarterly journal of economics |
| Year | 1974 |
| DOI |
10.2307/1881793
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| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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