Raising Rivals’ Costs

Clicks: 1
ID: 306439
2015
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal

Ranked #1,037 of 1,518 articles by views in Oxford University Press eBooks

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 1,518 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
Abstract RRC analysis principally focuses on a market with a dominant firm that is assumed to have significant market power, independent of any cost-raising strategies. The fundamental insight of the RRC theory is that increases in rivals’ marginal costs will lead the rivals to reduce their output relative to an initial equilibrium level. The dominant firm also experiences an increase in marginal cost that, other things equal, reduces its profits. RRC may not be profitable and, as a matter of economic theory, the net consumer-welfare effects of profitable cost-raising strategies are ambiguous. It is important to understand this theoretical ambiguity, particularly when evaluating the potential for vertical mergers to be anticompetitive.
Reference Key
openalex_W1563673657 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors David T. Scheffman, Richard Higgins
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2015
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199388592.013.0003
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199388592.013.0003
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.