International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy

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ID: 304362
1983
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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for “industrial strategy” policies such as R & D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. Domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries, although the subsidy-ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. Behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms.
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openalex_W3121574387 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Barbara J. Spencer, James A. Brander
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 1983
DOI
10.2307/2297771
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/2297771
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