The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, by D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins
Clicks: 1
ID: 303400
1992
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This
article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score —
reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
Reader Engagement
0.0
/100
1 views
0 readers
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Ranked #71 of 75 articles by views in political science quarterly
Most read
Least read
Bar heights use a square-root scale.
Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet mintedCreate a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.
5
SUSD
one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the autonomy of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W1993452298
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
|---|---|
| Authors | Joseph White |
| Journal | political science quarterly |
| Year | 1992 |
| DOI |
10.2307/2152152
|
| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.