What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions

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ID: 303336
1999
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Abstract
This paper investigates private-interest, public-interest, and political-institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state-level deregulation of bank branching restrictions. Using a hazard model, we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small, bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century. The same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation. While we find some support for each theory, the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results.
Reference Key
openalex_W2204579274 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Randy Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1999
DOI
10.1162/003355399556223
URL
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556223
Keywords Keywords not found

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