Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic

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ID: 302934
1980
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Abstract
Results of experiments designed to test the claim of psychologists that expected utility theory does not provide a good descriptive model are reported. The deviation from tested theory is that, in revising beliefs, individuals ignore prior or base-rate information contrary to Bayes rule. Flaws in the evidence in the psychological literature are noted, an experiment avoiding these difficulties is designed and carried out, and the psychologists' predictions are stated in terms of a more general model. The psychologists' predictions are confirmed for inexperienced or financially unmotivated subjects, but for others the evidence is less clear.
Reference Key
openalex_W2057925076 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors David M. Grether
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1980
DOI
10.2307/1885092
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/1885092
Keywords Keywords not found

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