Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty

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ID: 302188
1986
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Abstract
The central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects, and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than (or better than) that expectation, the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment (or elation) generating a decrement (or increment) of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence. By incorporating a simple disappointment-elation function into a model of individual choice, many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms—including violations of Savage's sure-thing principle and the "isolation effect"—can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour.
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openalex_W2057041949 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Graham Loomes, Robert Sugden
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 1986
DOI
10.2307/2297651
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

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