Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
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ID: 301370
1999
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Abstract
In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of "incomplete contracting" However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1999a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W3121577857
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|---|---|
| Authors | Oliver Hart, John Moore |
| Journal | The Review of Economic Studies |
| Year | 1999 |
| DOI |
10.1111/1467-937x.00080
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| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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