Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology
Clicks: 1
ID: 300116
1985
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This
article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score —
reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
Reader Engagement
0.0
/100
1 views
0 readers
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Ranked #171 of 195 articles by views in The Review of Economic Studies
Most read
Least read
Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 195 in total.
Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet mintedCreate a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.
5
SUSD
one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
We study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing. We show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly, but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game. If the gain to preemption is sufficiently small, then the optimal symmetric outcome, which involves "late" adoption, is an equilibrium. This contrasts with Reinganum's result that in precommitment equilibria there must be "diffusion". We develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing, which permits a continuous-time representation of the limit of discrete-time mixed-strategy equilibria.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W2049095227
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
|---|---|
| Authors | Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole |
| Journal | The Review of Economic Studies |
| Year | 1985 |
| DOI |
10.2307/2297660
|
| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.