History Versus Expectations

Clicks: 1
ID: 299816
1991
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal

Ranked #306 of 441 articles by views in the quarterly journal of economics

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 441 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
In models with external economies, there are often two or more long-run equilibria. Which equilibrium is chosen? Much of the literature presumes that "history" sets initial conditions that determine the outcome, but an alternative view stresses the role of "expectations," i.e., of self-fulfilling prophecy. This paper uses a simple trade model with both external economies and adjustment costs to show how the parameters of the economy determine the relative importance of history and expectations in determining equilibrium.
Reference Key
openalex_W2122403554 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Paúl Krugman
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1991
DOI
10.2307/2937950
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/2937950
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.