Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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ID: 297402
1996
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Abstract
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament.The parliament will set two types of policies: ideological and non-ideological.The parties have fixed positions on the ideological issues, but choose their non-ideological platforms to attract voters and campaign contributions.In this context, we ask: Flow do the equilibrium contributions from special interest groups influence the platforms of the parties?We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of infonried voters and members of special interest groups.The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.
Reference Key
openalex_W3023117367 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 1996
DOI
10.2307/2297852
URL
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