Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies

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ID: 296946
1995
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Ranked #33 of 195 articles by views in The Review of Economic Studies

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Abstract
We study a credit model where, because of adverse selection, unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed. Indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low-quality if sunk costs have already been incurred. We show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects, thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially. Thus, decentralization provides financial discipline. Nevertheless, we argue that it puts too high a premium on short-term returns. The model seems pertinent to two issues: “soft budget constraint” problems in centralized economies, and differences between “Anglo-Saxon” and “German-Japanese” financing practices.
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openalex_W2095370591 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors M. Dewatripont, Eric Maskin
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 1995
DOI
10.2307/2298076
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Keywords Keywords not found

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