Natural Goodness

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ID: 296180
2001
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Abstract
Abstract Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and Foot argues that this is the form of evaluation in moral judgements. Moral evaluations thus share a conceptual structure with evaluations of the characteristics and operations of living things, and can only be understood in these terms. The thesis of the book, then, is that vice is a natural defect, and virtue goodness of will; therefore propositions to do with goodness or badness in human character and action are not to be understood in psychological terms. In Ch. 1, Foot discusses and criticizes the subjectivism and non‐cognitivism that has dominated the past 60 years of analytical moral philosophy. Ch. 2 provides a sketch of an account of natural normativity in plants and animals, while Ch. 3 applies this to human beings, including a discussion of Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of promising. Ch. 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imparts to any adequate view of practical rationality. Ch. 5 attempts to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality and the domain of morality. Ch. 6 deals with the connection between goodness and happiness, while Ch. 7 discusses Nietzsche's immoralism.
Reference Key
openalex_W4213063924 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Philippa Foot
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 2001
DOI
10.1093/0198235089.001.0001
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001
Keywords Keywords not found

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