A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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ID: 295284
1996
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Abstract
The authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values, all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system. The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.
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openalex_W2159823353 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Martin J. Osborne, Alan Slivinski
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1996
DOI
10.2307/2946658
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/2946658
Keywords Keywords not found

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