The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

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ID: 292064
2002
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Abstract
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy.Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems.Having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive.This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy.The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India.We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest.
Reference Key
openalex_W3125755007 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Tim Besley, Robin Burgess
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 2002
DOI
10.1162/003355302320935061
URL
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935061
Keywords Keywords not found

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