Knowledge and Practical Interests
Clicks: 2
ID: 291920
2005
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This
article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score —
reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
Reader Engagement
Steady Performance
0.3
/100
2 views
0 readers
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
SteadyRanked #289 of 1,518 articles by views in Oxford University Press eBooks
Most read
Least read
Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 1,518 in total.
Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet mintedCreate a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.
5
SUSD
one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Abstract The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W2094298389
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
|---|---|
| Authors | Jason Stanley |
| Journal | Oxford University Press eBooks |
| Year | 2005 |
| DOI |
10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
|
| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.