Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade

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ID: 291755
2007
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Abstract
Is a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.
Reference Key
openalex_W2107223856 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Nathan Nunn
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 2007
DOI
10.1162/qjec.122.2.569
URL
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.569
Keywords Keywords not found

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