Social Norms and Community Enforcement

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ID: 291741
1992
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Abstract
The present paper extends the theory of self-enforcing agreements in a long-term relationship (the Folk Theorem in repeated games) to the situation where agents change their partners over time. Cooperation is sustained because defection against one agent causes sanction by others, and the paper shows how such a "social norm" is sustained by self-interested agents under various degrees of observability. Two main results are presented. The first one is an example where a community can sustain cooperation even when each agent knows nothing more than his personal experience. The second shows a Folk Theorem that the community can realize any mutually beneficial outcomes when each agent carries a label such as reputation, membership, or licence, which are revised in a systematic way.
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openalex_W2056700716 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Michihiro Kandori
Journal The Review of Economic Studies
Year 1992
DOI
10.2307/2297925
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/2297925
Keywords Keywords not found

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