The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons

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ID: 291473
1997
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Abstract
When should a government provide a service in-house, and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has. However, the private contractor's incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization.
Reference Key
openalex_W2100746853 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1997
DOI
10.1162/003355300555448
URL
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555448
Keywords Keywords not found

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