Moral Thinking

Clicks: 5
ID: 291350
1981
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Abstract
Abstract By distinguishing between two different levels of moral thinking, we see how utilitarian reasoning at the critical level—enlisting the impartial sympathy for others’ predicaments, which we must have if we fully understand them and universalize our preferences as morality requires—generates moral principles for use at the intuitive level, which square with common intuitions, e.g. about justice and rights. The reasoning itself depends on the logic of concepts, which all who ask moral questions are already using.
Reference Key
openalex_W4240827200 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors R. M. Hare
Journal Oxford University Press eBooks
Year 1981
DOI
10.1093/0198246609.001.0001
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/0198246609.001.0001
Keywords Keywords not found

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