Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange

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ID: 289962
1982
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Abstract
This paper explains involuntary unemployment in terms of the response of firms to workers' group behavior. Workers' effort depends upon the norms determining a fair day's work. In order to affect those norms, firms may pay more than the market-clearing wage. Industries that pay consistently more than the market-clearing wage are primary, and those that pay only the market-clearing wage are secondary. Thus, this paper also gives a theory for division of labor markets between primary and secondary.
Reference Key
openalex_W2099326003 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors George A. Akerlof
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 1982
DOI
10.2307/1885099
URL
https://doi.org/10.2307/1885099
Keywords Keywords not found

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