Politicians and Firms
Clicks: 1
ID: 289929
1994
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This
article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score —
reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
Reader Engagement
0.0
/100
1 views
0 readers
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Ranked #132 of 441 articles by views in the quarterly journal of economics
Most read
Least read
Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 441 in total.
Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet mintedCreate a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.
5
SUSD
one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W2030132760
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny |
| Journal | the quarterly journal of economics |
| Year | 1994 |
| DOI |
10.2307/2118354
|
| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.