The Regulation of Entry

Clicks: 3
ID: 289806
2002
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Steady

Ranked #33 of 441 articles by views in the quarterly journal of economics

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 441 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
Reference Key
openalex_W3123978952 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Journal the quarterly journal of economics
Year 2002
DOI
10.1162/003355302753399436
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.