Job Market Signaling
Clicks: 5
ID: 289157
1973
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Abstract
1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W2115747715
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|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Spence |
| Journal | the quarterly journal of economics |
| Year | 1973 |
| DOI |
10.2307/1882010
|
| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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