income distribution and rent seeking costs: a note
Clicks: 6
ID: 228817
2010
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This
article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score —
reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
Reader Engagement
Popular Article
1.5
/100
6 views
5 readers
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
PopularRanked #54 of 54 articles by views in jmir medical informatics
Most read
Least read
Bar heights use a square-root scale.
Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet mintedCreate a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.
5
SUSD
one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
This paper analyzes a rent seeking competition where risk neutral agents have a different income. The individual income is private information but the income distribution is common information. Like the Hillman and Samet (1987) model the individual outlays in rent seeking is equal to the expected rent, but the winning probability for each agent is a function of its income. As a consequence, the social costs of the rent seeking depend on the income distribution and they can be lesser than the traditional measure pointed out by Hillman and Samet (1987).
| Reference Key |
antonelli2010annalsincome
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
|---|---|
| Authors | ;MARIA ALESSANDRA ANTONELLI |
| Journal | jmir medical informatics |
| Year | 2010 |
| DOI |
DOI not found
|
| URL | |
| Keywords |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.