the emotional moves of a rational actor: smiles, scowls, and other credible messages

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ID: 218863
2017
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Ranked #3 of 27 articles by views in journal of macromolecular science, part c

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Abstract
Many scholars turn to emotions to understand irrational behavior. We do the opposite: we turn to rationality and game theory to understand people’s emotions. We discuss a striking theory of emotions that began with the game theory of credible threats and promises, then was enriched by evolutionary biology and psychology, and now is being tested in psychological experiments. We review some of these experiments which use economic games to set up strategic situations with real payoffs. The experiments test whether a player’s emotional expressions lend credibility to promises, threats, and claims of danger or hardship. The results offer insights into the hidden strategies behind a warm smile, an angry scowl, a look of terror, and eyes of despair.
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reed2017gamesthe Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors ;Lawrence Ian Reed;Peter DeScioli
Journal journal of macromolecular science, part c
Year 2017
DOI
10.3390/g8020018
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