defense-attack interaction over optimally designed defense systems via games and reliability

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ID: 163011
2014
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Abstract
This paper analyzes defense systems taking into account the strategic interactions between two rational agents; one of them is interested in designing a defense system against purposeful attacks of the other. The interaction is characterized by a sequential game with perfect and complete information. Reliability plays a fundamental role in both defining agents' actions and in measuring performance of the defense system for which a series-parallel configuration is set up by the defender. The attacker, in turn, focuses on only one defense subsystem in order to maximize her efficiency in attacking. An algorithm involving backward induction is developed to determine the equilibrium paths of the game. Application examples are also provided.
Reference Key
lins2014pesquisadefense-attack Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors ;Isis Didier Lins;Paulo Renato Alves Firmino;Diogo de Carvalho Bezerra;Márcio das Chagas Moura;Enrique López Droguett;Leandro Chaves Rêgo;Carlos Renato dos Santos
Journal t\"urk ya\csam bilimleri dergisi
Year 2014
DOI
10.1590/0101-7438.2014.034.02.0215
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