dificuldades da concepção de john searle sobre a redução da consciência: o problema das capacidades causais

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ID: 152369
2008
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Abstract
This paper investigates Searle’s account of reduction concerning the compatibility between causal reduction and simultaneous ontological irreducibility of consciousness to brain activity. The causal reduction of consciousness – the causal explicability of its features by brain processes and the identity of its causal powers (section 2) – is incompatible with ontological irreducibility (section 3), because the ontological difference between subjective and objective features make the identity of causal powers incomprehensible (section 4). The main problem is that Searle’s theory states and simultaneously denies the identity between consciousness and brain processes (section 5).
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prata2008princpiosdificuldades Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors ;Tárik de Athayde Prata
Journal jurnal teknologi dan industri pangan
Year 2008
DOI
DOI not found
URL
http://www.principios.cchla.ufrn.br/24P-05-29.pdf
Keywords
theory of knowledgemetaphysicsphilosophy (general)

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