razão (prática) e natureza na crítica da faculdade do juízo (practical) reason and nature in critique of judgement
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2009
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Abstract
Na Crítica da Razão Pura e em outros lugares, Kant apresenta uma aguda distinção entre natureza e razão prática. De acordo com Kant, não é possível deduzir ou derivar todos os sentidos dos imperativos morais dos conhecimentos empíricos sobre o mundo. Alguns intérpretes (como John MacDowell) argumentam que a concepção de razão prática em Kant pode ser ilusória se baseada em uma visão da natureza indefinida, decorrente de um ponto de vista newtoniano. Nesse texto discutirei a relação entre razão prática e natureza na Crítica da faculdade de julgar de Kant. Argumentarei que na segunda parte da obra, Kant introduz um conceito de natureza muito mais rico que as críticas lhe têm atribuído.
In this Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere Kant argues for a sharp distinction between nature and pratical reason. According to Kant, it is not possible to deduce or derive in any way moral imperatives from our empirical knowledge about the world. Some of his readers (like John McDowell) have argued that Kant's conception of pratical reason is misleading just because of his claim that nature itself is meaningless because of his mere Newtonian outlook. In my paper I will discuss the relation between practical reason and nature in Kant's Critique of Judgement. I will argue that in the second part of this work, Kant introduces a concept of nature that is much richer than critiques are willing to concede to him.
In this Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere Kant argues for a sharp distinction between nature and pratical reason. According to Kant, it is not possible to deduce or derive in any way moral imperatives from our empirical knowledge about the world. Some of his readers (like John McDowell) have argued that Kant's conception of pratical reason is misleading just because of his claim that nature itself is meaningless because of his mere Newtonian outlook. In my paper I will discuss the relation between practical reason and nature in Kant's Critique of Judgement. I will argue that in the second part of this work, Kant introduces a concept of nature that is much richer than critiques are willing to concede to him.
| Reference Key |
klemme2009trans/form/aorazo
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| Authors | ;Heiner F. Klemme |
| Journal | hong kong journal of paediatrics |
| Year | 2009 |
| DOI |
10.1590/S0101-31732009000100004
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| URL | |
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