Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative

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ID: 83669
2009
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Abstract
The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a theory of epistemic value.
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ahlstrom2009intuitionsstudia Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Ahlstrom, Kristoffer;
Journal studia philosophica estonica
Year 2009
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