Optimal Strategies of Product Price, Quality, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility.
Clicks: 256
ID: 69147
2019
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Abstract
With the awakening of environmental consciousness, more and more firms desire to go "green" by shifting their focus of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from charitable contributions to environmental actions called corporate environmental responsibility (CER). We develop a monopoly differential game to depict optimal corporate strategies of product price, quality, and CER. Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, we analyze optimal feedback equilibrium strategies for pricing and investing in both quality and CER with/without government subsidies. Numerical simulations show that government subsidy can improve CER and profit.
| Reference Key |
peng2019optimalinternational
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| Authors | Peng, Wei;Xin, Baogui;Kwon, Yekyung; |
| Journal | International journal of environmental research and public health |
| Year | 2019 |
| DOI |
E4704
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| URL | |
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